openssh (1:9.5p1-1) experimental; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 9.5p1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-keygen(1): generate Ed25519 keys by default. Ed25519 public keys
are very convenient due to their small size. Ed25519 keys are specified
in RFC 8709 and OpenSSH has supported them since version 6.5 (January
2014).
* sshd(8): the Subsystem directive now accurately preserves quoting of
subsystem commands and arguments. This may change behaviour for exotic
configurations, but the most common subsystem configuration
(sftp-server) is unlikely to be affected.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Thu, 23 Nov 2023 17:38:07 +0000
openssh (1:9.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 9.4p1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-agent(1): PKCS#11 modules must now be specified by their full
paths. Previously dlopen(3) could search for them in system library
directories.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Sat, 02 Sep 2023 21:02:53 +0100
openssh (1:9.3p2-1) unstable; urgency=high
OpenSSH 9.3p2 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added to
restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify requests
that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does this, but
forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools may circumvent
this restriction.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Wed, 19 Jul 2023 21:57:53 +0100
openssh (1:9.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 9.2 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh(1): add a new EnableEscapeCommandline ssh_config(5) option that
controls whether the client-side ~C escape sequence that provides a
command-line is available. Among other things, the ~C command-line
could be used to add additional port-forwards at runtime.
This option defaults to "no", disabling the ~C command-line that was
previously enabled by default. Turning off the command-line allows
platforms that support sandboxing of the ssh(1) client (currently only
OpenBSD) to use a stricter default sandbox policy.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Wed, 08 Feb 2023 10:36:06 +0000
openssh (1:9.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 9.1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are
now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously if an
environment variable was multiply specified the last set value would
have been used.
* ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types) will
no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been
used by default for some years.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Mon, 14 Nov 2022 16:35:59 +0000
openssh (1:9.0p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 9.0 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* This release switches scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to
using the SFTP protocol by default.
Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
"scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
as shell commands on the remote side.
This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.
Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
paths relative to other user's home directories, for example - "scp
host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a
~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a
protocol extension "expand-path@openssh.com" to support this.
In case of incompatibility, the scp(1) client may be instructed to use
the legacy scp/rcp using the -O flag.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Sat, 09 Apr 2022 14:14:10 +0100
openssh (1:8.8p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 8.8 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm by
default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is no need to
replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332 RSA/SHA-256/512
signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys will
automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
options. For example, the following stanza in ~/.ssh/config will enable
RSA/SHA1 for host and user authentication for a single destination
host:
Host old-host
HostkeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-rsa
We recommend enabling RSA/SHA1 only as a stopgap measure until legacy
implementations can be upgraded or reconfigured with another key type
(such as ECDSA or Ed25519).
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Tue, 15 Feb 2022 19:20:21 +0000
openssh (1:8.7p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 8.7 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote copies
(e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the local host by
default. This was previously available via the -3 flag. This mode
avoids the need to expose credentials on the origin hop, avoids
triplicate interpretation of filenames by the shell (by the local
system, the copy origin and the destination) and, in conjunction with
the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned below, allows use of all
authentication methods to the remote hosts (previously, only
non-interactive methods could be used). A -R flag has been added to
select the old behaviour.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a stricter
configuration file parser. The new parser uses more shell-like rules
for quotes, space and escape characters. It is also more strict in
rejecting configurations that include options lacking arguments.
Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could appear on a line with no
subsequent arguments. This release will reject such configurations. The
new parser will also reject configurations with unterminated quotes and
multiple '=' characters after the option name.
* ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification, ssh(1)
will verify all matching records instead of just those with the
specific signature type requested. This may cause host key verification
problems if stale SSHFP records of a different or legacy signature type
exist alongside other records for a particular host. bz#3322
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an explicit
attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge will now be
hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This removes the
(undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly 32 bytes in
length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
* sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are now
first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment variable
names.
OpenSSH 8.5 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration for
interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of the SSH
session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive. The
ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after authentication
completes.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before it
was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and disabled by
default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly documented in
ssh.1 in 2001.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum hybrid
key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled with
X25519.
The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org method is replaced
with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Per its designers, the
sntrup4591761 algorithm was superseded almost two years ago by
sntrup761.
(note this both the updated method and the one that it replaced are
disabled by default)
* ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Sat, 06 Nov 2021 12:23:47 +0000
openssh (1:8.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 8.4 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-keygen(1): the format of the attestation information optionally
recorded when a FIDO key is generated has changed. It now includes the
authenticator data needed to validate attestation signatures.
* The API between OpenSSH and the FIDO token middleware has changed and
the SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR version has been incremented as a result.
Third-party middleware libraries must support the current API version
(7) to work with OpenSSH 8.4.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Sun, 18 Oct 2020 12:07:48 +0100
openssh (1:8.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 8.3 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* sftp(1): reject an argument of "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and scp(1)
do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Sun, 07 Jun 2020 13:44:04 +0100
openssh (1:8.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 8.2 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): This release removes the "ssh-rsa"
(RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
(i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use
the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1)
CA signs new certificates.
Certificates are at special risk to SHA1 collision vulnerabilities as
an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a
collision that yields them a valid certificate, far more than the
relatively brief LoginGraceTime window that they have to forge a host
key signature.
The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically
random) nonce value near the start of the certificate that should make
exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context challenging,
as the attacker does not have full control over the prefix that
actually gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a demonstrably broken
algorithm and further improvements in attacks are highly likely.
OpenSSH releases prior to 7.2 do not support the newer RSA/SHA2
algorithms and will refuse to accept certificates signed by an OpenSSH
8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is explicitly
selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa"). Older
clients/servers may use another CA key type such as ssh-ed25519
(supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521
types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7) instead if they cannot be upgraded.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from the default
key exchange proposal for both the client and server.
* ssh-keygen(1): The command-line options related to the generation and
screening of safe prime numbers used by the
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange algorithms have changed.
Most options have been folded under the -O flag.
* sshd(8): The sshd listener process title visible to ps(1) has changed
to include information about the number of connections that are
currently attempting authentication and the limits configured by
MaxStartups.
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Fri, 21 Feb 2020 16:36:37 +0000
openssh (1:8.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
OpenSSH 8.1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:
* ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with an RSA
key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible with
OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is overridden (using
"ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Thu, 10 Oct 2019 10:23:19 +0100
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